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In this paper, we suggest a framework for the analysis of ethnic polarization. This framework 
allows for the measurement of ethnic or religious polarization. We apply our measure to Ivory 
Coast and find a surprising result as the ethnic polarization decreased in years preceding the 
conflict in the country.  However, further decomposition of the ethnic polarization index allows 
us to understand better how the variation in polarization may have induced this conflict. 
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Résumé 
Dans cet article, nous proposons un cadre d’analyse de la polarisation ethnique. Ce cadre 
analytique permet d’analyser la polarisation ethnique et religieuse. Nous appliquons ce cadre à 
des données de la Côte d’Ivoire et constatons que la polarisation ethnique a diminué durant les 
années précédant le conflit. Par contre,  une décomposition plus fine de notre indice de 
polarisation ethnique nous permet de mieux comprendre comment les variations de polarisation 
ont pu induire le conflit. 
Mots-clé: Polarisation ethnique, Conflit, Côte d’Ivoire  
Classification JEL: D63, I30 
 1. Introduction 
In the last three decades, a large body of the literature tackled the comparison between 
living standards’ distributions. Most of the research focused on the measurement of inequality, 
social welfare and poverty. These comparisons are, however, missing a potentially important 
aspect of the distribution of living standards; namely polarization
5. Recently there has been a 
growing body of research on polarization measurement: Esteban and Ray (1994), Foster and 
Wolfson (1994), Wolfson (1994 and 1997), Wang and Tsui (2000), D'Ambrosio (2001), Duclos, 
Esteban and Ray (2004) and Esteban, Gradin and Ray (2007). This polarization has often been 
associated with social unrest. In fact, Esteban and Ray (1999) show, in their theoretical model, 
that an increase of polarization may be the source of social conflict.  All the measures mentioned 
above focused on income polarization, nevertheless, the world in the post-Cold War period has 
witnessed an eclipse of social class conflicts and the emergence of ethnic conflicts (Brubaker and 
Laitin, 1998). These conflicts are however not exclusively ethnic. Robinson (2001), Esteban and 
Ray (2005) and Caselli and Coleman (2006) pointed out that ethnicity may be a marker for 
economic grabbing.  
The objective of this paper is to develop an index of ethnic polarization that is based 
simultaneously on income and ethnicity. These two dimensions of polarization may be potential 
determinants of ethnic conflict.  To illustrate, we apply this index using Ivorian data. Results 
show that the decline of economic power of the Akan group may be the source of the emergence 
of the ethnic conflict that has marked the country in the end of the 90s.  
The remaining of the paper is organized as follow. In section two we present our ethnic 
polarization index. Section three applies this index to the Enquête prioritaire en Côte d’Ivoire 
(EPCI) for 1993 and 1998 in order to explain the emergence of the ethnic conflict in this country. 





                                                 
5 To illustrate the focus of the last decades, note for instance that the concept of polarization is not even mentioned 
in the important Handbook on Income Distribution edited by Atkinson and Bourguignon (2000). 2.  A measure of ethnic polarization 
  In this section, we build on Esteban and Ray (1994) and Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) 
and construct an ethnic polarization index. In general, polarization is determined by alienation 
and identification. The more identified the individual is with an alienated group, the more 
important is the antagonism with individual of other groups.  To have a better grasp of how these 
two factors can influence polarization, it is important to present an overview Esteban and Ray’s 
(1994) and Duclos, Esteban et Ray’s (2004) framework. These latter derive their income 
polarization index using an axiomatic approach that can be intuitively described as follows: 
1) Polarization does not increase if there is only one pole in the distribution and if the 
mode of this distribution increases. 
2) Polarization does not decrease if there are three poles in a distribution and if the modes 
of the extreme poles increase in the same fashion. 
3) Polarization increases if two symmetric poles move away from each other. 
4) Polarization is not affected by the population size. 
Esteban and Ray’s (1994) polarization index satisfies the above mentioned conditions and can be 
formally written as follows: 
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6 and α , the degree of aversion to polarization.  For a value of  0 = α , this 
index correspond to the Gini index of inequality. The higherα , the larger is the difference 
between this index and the concept of inequality.   
  As mentioned above, polarization is based on an identification/alienation framework. It 
depends on how much individuals identify with their own group. This identification exacerbates 
the alienation experienced when an individual compares his income to that of individuals from 
other groups. This alienation between two individuals, of whom one is member of group   and 
the other is member of group 
i
j  is captured by the difference in their income,  j i y y − . 
Identification of individuals to their own group i is captured through  . In this context,   
α πi
                                                 
6 The use of the natural logarithm implies that the absolute difference in the equation may be interpreted has relative 




   A major problem arises when we try to implement empirically Esteban and Ray’s (1994) 
index of polarization. In fact, we have to redistribute all observed income, which can be seen as 
drawn from a continuous distribution, into a finite set of income group. This implies that we can 
consider every observed income as assigned to a group for which the continuous support interval 
has been defined arbitrarily. In this context, two incomes that are almost equal may be assigned 
to two different income groups if they lie on different sides of a limit between those groups. To 
address this problem, Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) develop another polarization index. This 
index is based on kernel estimation of income density; it therefore avoids the problem of 
defining arbitrarily the frontiers between income groups. The interpretation of the axioms 
underlying the index is similar to the ones in Esteban and Ray (1994). 
Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) show that a polarization index respects those axioms if 
and only if it is proportional to: 
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This index may be decomposed into an alienation  and identification components. Average 
identification is given by 
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DER P  may be expressed as the product of identification, alienation and their 
normalized covariance: 
(8)   ) 1 ( ) ( ρ ια α + = a f P
DER . 
In this paper, we are interested in measuring ethnic or religious polarization. Therefore, 
we must modify the above mentioned indices which have been developed in the context of pure 
income polarization. We assume that ethnic or religious polarization is an increasing function of 
income polarization between ethnic or religious groups. It is also an increasing function of 
individuals’ identification to their ethnic or religious group. We assume that we have   ethnic 
groups and that the population size is normalized to 1. In this context, we have: 
n







where  i π  represents the population share of group  .  i
  A first method of measuring ethnic polarization that may come to our mind consists of 
using Esteban and Ray’s (1994) index while assigning to each individual the average income of 
his own ethnic group. In this context, we have: 
(10)    with
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Nevertheless, this measure is independent of the individuals’ identification to their own 
ethnic group. We assume that identification is inversely related to income polarization within a 
given ethnic group and measure polarization inside each ethnic group using Duclos, Esteban and 
Ray’s (2004) index : 
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  Combining (10) and (11), we can measure ethnic polarization as an increasing function of 
polarization between groups and identification of individuals to their group. As identification is 








3.  An application to Ivory Coast 
3.1 Data 
  Our empirical application uses the data from the Enquête prioritaire en Côte d’Ivoire 
(EPCI) for 1993 and 1998. These surveys focused on the social dimensions of structural 
adjustment and were conducted with the assistance of the World Bank. In 1993, 9600 were 
surveyed and 4200 in 1998. In our analysis, we use expenditure figures as they seem to be a 
better proxy for household welfare then the declared incomes.
7 Both surveys provide detailed 
information on the ethnicities which allows us to perform our ethnic polarization analysis. 
 
Table 3.1 








1993  9  600 56  700 159  070 
1998  4  200 24  128 494  263 
 
  The average income of this table was used in normalizing household income between the 
surveys. 
3.2 Polarization index 
  We first compute our polarization index 
DER P , for the two periods of interest. We then 
decompose it into three components; namely alienation, identification and normalized covariance 




                                                 
7 We will make reference to household income even if we use expenditure as a proxy for simplicity. Table 3.2 
Polarization index 
Year Polarization  Alienation  Identification
Normalized 
covariance  
1993 0,1951  0,3950  0,6458  -0,2353 
1998 0,1896  0,3782  0,6710  -0,2528 
Δ%  -2,81% -4,26%  3,90%  7,45% 
  
Looking at table 3.2, we notice that the overall variation in polarization does not have the 
expected sign; it decreases by 2.81%. Normally, we would have expected an increase in the 
polarization index given the reduction in redistribution programs during the period we are 
considering. Turning our attention to the three components, we notice that they do not all exhibit 
that same trend. Alienation decreases but by a larger magnitude (-4.26%) whereas identification 
increases by 3.9%. The normalized covariance is the one that changes the most at 7.45%.
  These figures give an overall picture of the evolution of income distribution between the 
two periods. Since we are interested in understanding the source of the ethnic conflict, we move 
to the estimation of ethnic polarization.   
3.3 Ethnic polarization index 
  We assume that an increasing ethnic polarization can be at the source of ethnic conflicts. 
For the period we are considering, we observe a decrease in ethnic polarization. As we have 
mentioned earlier, programs that previously contributed to the redistribution in Ivory Coast were 
significantly reduced. The “ivoirité” concept is an illustration that redistribution across ethnic 
groups was no longer in the plans of the government.  Given these circumstances we should 
normally expect an increase in ethnic polarization; nevertheless we observe a significant 
decrease.  
Table 3.3.1 








1993  0,3906 0,0692 0,1771 
1998  0,1456 0,0283 0,1945 
Δ%  -62,73% -59,07%  9,80% 
 
  As we have mentioned, we can decompose our index into an inter-group and an intra-
group alienation. A reduction in redistributive programs is expected to increase the inter-group 
alienation. In fact we observe the opposite; the intra-group alienation component increased. This 
increase accentuates the decrease in total ethnic polarization for the period at hand. To get a 
better understanding of this counterintuitive result, it is necessary to look at the evolution of the 
polarization index for each ethnic group. To do so, further decomposition of our index is 
required
8.  
  Looking at table 3.3.2, we note that the Krou and Akan comprise more then half our 
sample size. Polarization indices range from 0.16 to 0.23 with the exception of the Malians who 
exhibit the highest index at 0.44. This discrepancy is due to the high level of identification 
prevailing among the Malians compared to other groups. Given that the Malians’ group size is 
relatively small; their contribution to overall polarization will be relatively modest. At this point 
it is important to note that the average income of the Akans, the group that is favoured by 
government policies, is below the national average. Moreover, the average income of immigrants 
is above the national average.  
                                                 
8 As Ivory Coast is host to over 60 ethnic groups, we used families of ethnic groups.  Akan Family 0,2946 0,1637 0,2952 0,6836 -0,189 0,6949
Krou Family 0,2187 0,1687 0,306 0,6775 -0,1863 0,648
North Mande Family 0,0503 0,183 0,3641 0,6191 -0,1883 0,6892
South Mande Family 0,1047 0,1842 0,3585 0,652 -0,2121 1,8561
Voltaïque Family 0,0698 0,2035 0,3634 0,7321 -0,235 1,7564
Burkinabé Family 0,0401 0,1791 0,3372 0,653 -0,1867 1,1557
Malian Family 0,0022 0,4363 0,3913 1,3293 -0,1613 1,9889
Ghanaian Family 0,1374 0,1828 0,3586 0,6503 -0,2161 1,1611
Other Africans 0,0117 0,2324 0,3138 0,9101 -0,186 1,2213
Naturalized Ivorians 0,0706 0,1895 0,3602 0,6585 -0,2012 1,0987
Table 3.3.2
Group polarization index (1993)







In 1998 (table 3.3.3), the situation changed significantly. First, the Akan and Krou 
families saw their proportion decrease while the Malians increased their share of total 
population. The polarization of the Malians is now in the same range as other groups. Second, 
the naturalized Ivorians have now the highest polarization (90 percent above the national 
average). Both, changes in alienation and identification contribute for this large change in 
polarization. Once again, it is important to highlight the fact that this group represents less than 
one percent of the total population. Consequently, its contribution to the change in the total 
ethnic polarization index is very small. In 1998, the average income of the Akan and Krou 
families is higher than the national average.  
Akan Family 0,3046 0,1903 0,3792 0,6837 -0,2658 1,1756
Krou Family 0,1497 0,1935 0,3616 0,6949 -0,2299 1,0284
North Mande Family 0,1827 0,2017 0,3851 0,7074 -0,2598 0,8453
South Mande Family 0,0931 0,1825 0,2995 0,7479 -0,1852 0,9174
Voltaïque Family 0,09 0,2019 0,4037 0,6919 -0,2772 0,9896
Burkinabé Family 0,0905 0,1923 0,3464 0,7301 -0,2397 0,8534
Malian Family 0,0331 0,1819 0,3485 0,6891 -0,2424 0,7698
Ghanaian Family 0,0089 0,206 0,3342 0,6953 -0,1137 0,8205
Other Africans 0,0445 0,2067 0,4039 0,6817 -0,2494 1,0123
Naturalized Ivorians 0,003 0,368 0,5584 0,8471 -0,222 1,3598
Table 3.3.3
Group polarization index (1998)





 Focusing our attention on the evolution between the two periods allows us to shed light 
on the role of changing ethnic polarization as a source of the conflict in Ivory Coast. Before 
analyzing our results, it is important to mention an important caveat. Our two survey samples 
(9600 in 1993 and 4200 in 1998) sizes imply that our sub-group samples can become relatively 
small. For example, the Malian and Ghanaian are represented by 139 and 37 households 
respectively in the 1998 survey. The sampling process did not consider ethnicity as a criterion for 
designing the sampling plan. This induces important variation in the weight of different groups 
between the samples. The robustness of our results for these groups with small weights has to be 
considered relatively weak. Hence, we will focus on the analysis of groups with stronger weights 
in the samples.  
Akan Family 16,30% 28,45% 0,01% 40,66% 69,18%
Krou Family 14,72% 18,19% 2,57% 23,43% 58,71%
North Mande Family 10,21% 5,76% 14,27% 37,96% 22,64%
South Mande Family -0,93% -16,48% 14,70% -12,67% -50,57%
Voltaïque Family -0,81% 11,09% -5,50% 17,99% -43,66%
Burkinabé Family 7,36% 2,72% 11,80% 28,36% -26,16%
Malian Family -58,30% -10,94% -48,16% 50,31% -61,30%
Ghanaian Family 12,68% -6,80% 6,92% -47,41% -29,34%
Other Africans -11,08% 28,74% -25,10% 34,12% -17,11%
Naturalized Ivorians 94,22% 55,01% 28,64% 10,31% 23,77%
Normalized 
covariance
Ethnic group Polarization Alienation Identification
Normalized 
average income




Excluding two of the small groups (Malian and Naturalized Ivorian) the changes are 
within reasonable range. During the period of analysis, redistributive programs were strongly 
contracted. This was a consequence of the drop in prices of cocoa and coffee which put 
enormous pressure on government revenues. The reduction of transfer programs and the rise of 
“ivoirité” should have concentrated direct and indirect transfers to the groups that are closer to 
political power (namely the Akan and Krou groups). While we expected to observe an increase 
in polarization in ethnic groups that are away from political power, we observe the opposite. It is 
the Akan (+16,3%) and Krou (+14,7%) who are most negatively affected in the period. 
Polarization at the national level decreases after the reduction in distribution programs. This is an interesting result that could explain part of the increasing tension between the politically 
dominant groups and other groups among which non ivorians. In fact, the Akan and Krou were 
likely the biggest winners from the transfers programs. Their elimination might have contributed 
to the improvement of the situation of other groups relative to the Akan and Krou groups. This is 
reflected by the reduction in polarization for four groups (South Mande, Voltaic, Malian and 
Other African) and relatively weak increases in polarization for the Burkinabe and North Mande 
groups.  
In light of our results and contrary to our initial anticipation, it is not an increase in 
overall polarization that has led to the conflict. Disadvantaged groups improved their situation in 
terms of polarization whereas the politically dominant groups experienced the strongest increase 
in their indices. This strong movement could have contributed to the eruption of the conflict in 
1999. Consequently, looking uniquely at an aggregate polarization index would have led us to 
conclude a reduction in polarization and that the change in income distribution was not one of 
the determinants of the conflict in Ivory Coast. Our ethnic polarization framework allows us to 
isolate the movement of polarization in different groups. It also allows us to argue that the strong 
and quick change in income distribution between and within groups can be one of the 
determinants of the political conflict that started at the end of 1999. 
3.4 Religious polarization 
As the religious dichotomy in Ivory Coast is often cited to be at the origin of the conflict, 
it is therefore interesting to investigate how our index evolves based on this decomposition. 
Moreover, it is interesting to compare this decomposition with the one presented in the previous 
section. Our data distinguished two main religious groups (Catholics and Muslims) and other 
religions.  
  Results are presented in Table 3.4.1. As for ethnic polarization, religious polarization also 
decreased during the period. Our results show that inter-group alienation is lower for the 1998 
data. On the other hand, intra-group polarization has barely changed between the two periods. As 
no distributive programs were targeted to religious groups, it is not surprising that the removal of 







1993 0,3028 0,0579 0,1912
1998 0,2535 0,0476 0,1879





We also present in the appendix a decomposition of the PP
DER index for each group as well 
as the elements required for computation of the religious polarization index.  
 
4. Conclusion 
  In this paper, we have presented a heuristic derivation of an ethnic polarization index. 
Using this index, we have tried to explain how ethnic polarization may have played a role in the 
emergence of the ethnic conflict in Côte d’Ivoire. In future research, two paths may be followed. 
First, on a theoretical level, it may be interesting to develop an index of ethnic polarization based 
on an axiomatic approach. Second, on an empirical level it may be worth to examine the 
dynamics of ethnic polarization during the end of Houmphouët-Boigny’s reign using data from 
the 80’s as the movement in polarization during this period may explain the political unrest of 





Polarization index (1993) 





Musulman 0,3942  0,1945  0,3839  0,6618  -0,2343  0,9323 
Chrétien 0,3162  0,1982  0,4065  0,6285  -0,2243  1,2397 
Autre 0,2896  0,1789  0,3588  0,6357  -0,2158  0,8304 
 1,0000           
 
Table A.2 
Polarization index (1998) 





Musulman 0,3987  0,1856  0,3613  0,6788  -0,2430  0,8676 
Chrétien 0,3490  0,1977  0,3933  0,6869  -0,2681  1,1617 
Autre 0,2522  0,1780  0,3426  0,6682  -0,2225  0,9855 
 1,0000           
 
Table A.3 
Variation of the polarization index 





Musulman 1,13%  -4,57%  -5,89%  2,56%  3,70%  -6,94% 
Chrétien 10,40%  -0,25%  -3,25%  9,28%  19,56%  -6,30% 
Autre -12,89%  -0,48%  -4,51%  5,11%  3,08%  18,67% References 
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